{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://abysslink.github.io/abysslink/schemas/alevidence-v1.schema.json",
  "title": "Abysslink evidence-bundle manifest (v1)",
  "description": "JSON Schema for manifest.json, the signed head of an .alevidence bundle produced by `abysslink audit evidence` (and the object emitted by `abysslink audit evidence --json`). This is the ingest contract the future Teams/aggregation plane consumes. The manifest is an OPERATOR ATTESTATION signed with the rig's ed25519 evidence key: it states, over a signed byte range, the audit-chain verification outcome the operator's abysslink computed (which requires the secret HMAC key an external auditor does not hold). A valid signature over an unexpected `signing.key_fingerprint` is still internally valid — the out-of-band fingerprint pin is the trust anchor. This schema mirrors internal/evidence.Manifest exactly; drift is a bug (see internal/evidence/schema_test.go).",
  "type": "object",
  "additionalProperties": false,
  "required": [
    "alevidence_v",
    "generated_at",
    "rig",
    "range",
    "chain",
    "contents",
    "signing"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "alevidence_v": {
      "type": "integer",
      "const": 1,
      "description": "Bundle format version. Bumped only for append-only-incompatible manifest changes; a new major version ships as a new alevidence-vN.schema.json."
    },
    "generated_at": {
      "type": "string",
      "format": "date-time",
      "description": "When the bundle was produced, RFC3339 in UTC (e.g. 2026-07-09T12:00:00Z)."
    },
    "rig": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "description": "Identifies the machine the evidence came from.",
      "required": ["hostname", "abysslink_version"],
      "properties": {
        "hostname": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Short hostname of the rig."
        },
        "abysslink_version": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Version of the abysslink binary that produced the bundle."
        }
      }
    },
    "range": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "description": "The [since, until] window the bundle covers. Both bounds are optional; an absent bound means an open end (full history on that side).",
      "properties": {
        "since": {
          "type": "string",
          "format": "date-time",
          "description": "Only include actions at/after this RFC3339 UTC time. Omitted when open-ended."
        },
        "until": {
          "type": "string",
          "format": "date-time",
          "description": "Only include actions at/before this RFC3339 UTC time. Omitted when open-ended."
        }
      }
    },
    "chain": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "description": "The operator's abysslink attesting the audit-chain verification outcome — the part an external auditor cannot recompute without the secret HMAC key. Signed, so the attestation is bound to the evidence key.",
      "required": [
        "verified",
        "entry_count",
        "sigs_verified",
        "sigs_skipped",
        "key_epoch",
        "counter_status",
        "truncation_detected"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "verified": {
          "type": "boolean",
          "description": "True only when the chain verified OK AND no truncation was detected AND the result is not indeterminate."
        },
        "entry_count": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 0,
          "description": "Number of audit entries in the bundled audit.jsonl."
        },
        "sigs_verified": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 0,
          "description": "Count of entries whose per-entry HMAC signature verified."
        },
        "sigs_skipped": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 0,
          "description": "Count of entries whose signature could not be checked (e.g. pre-signing legacy entries)."
        },
        "key_epoch": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 0,
          "maximum": 4294967295,
          "description": "The audit key epoch at generation time (uint32)."
        },
        "counter_status": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": ["verified", "unknown", "mismatch", ""],
          "description": "AUD-02 keychain monotonic-counter check (honest tri-state, never coerced to PASS): 'verified' counter matches entry count; 'unknown' counter unavailable/degraded; 'mismatch' counter exceeds entries (genuine tail truncation); '' a pre-AUD-02 log with no counter."
        },
        "truncation_detected": {
          "type": "boolean",
          "description": "True when tail truncation of the audit log was detected."
        },
        "reason": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Human-readable explanation when the chain did not fully verify. Omitted on a clean result."
        }
      }
    },
    "contents": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "description": "Pins the SHA-256 of every other file in the bundle; the signature over this manifest transitively covers those files.",
      "required": ["audit_jsonl_sha256", "report_md_sha256"],
      "properties": {
        "audit_jsonl_sha256": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$",
          "description": "Lowercase hex SHA-256 of the bundled audit.jsonl."
        },
        "report_md_sha256": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$",
          "description": "Lowercase hex SHA-256 of the bundled report.md."
        }
      }
    },
    "signing": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "description": "Describes the ed25519 key that signed the manifest. The verifier checks the signature with public_key; the auditor pins key_fingerprint out-of-band (SSH-host-key trust model).",
      "required": ["algo", "public_key", "key_fingerprint"],
      "properties": {
        "algo": {
          "type": "string",
          "const": "ed25519",
          "description": "Signature algorithm; only ed25519 is defined for v1."
        },
        "public_key": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{43}=$",
          "description": "Standard base64 of the 32-byte ed25519 public key (44 chars)."
        },
        "key_fingerprint": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$",
          "description": "Lowercase hex SHA-256 of the ed25519 public key — the value the operator states out-of-band and the auditor pins with `--expect-key`."
        }
      }
    }
  }
}